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The state plays an important role in shaping the character and context of national 
systems of industrial relations, be it as a political player, legislator, and/or employer.  
During the last twenty years, the specific contribution of the state has been much 
debated, particularly in terms of the role of the welfare state and the integration of 
organised labour into the political apparatus of state decision-making (see for example 
Berger and Compston, 2002). Such concerns have been accompanied by broader 
debates around the political imperatives shaping state reform in terms of the shift 
from demand to supply-side economics and the concomitant deregulation of labour 
markets that has taken place (Regini, 2000; Esping-Anderson, 2000).  The debate is 
exhaustive and whilst it is agreed that the state has moved towards a more market-
oriented approach with a weaker commitment to organised labour and collective 
worker rights, conclusions are by no means clear.  The transition away from 
traditional state roles is mediated in various ways, and with variable outcomes (Koch, 
2005; Kochan, 2006; Jessop, 2002a).  
 
Yet, from an industrial relations perspective, there has been little consideration in 
much of this debate of the changing role of the state’s mediation and arbitration 
services in the processes of management-labour relations. Many developed state 
systems have arbitration services that play a role in pacifying and stabilising industrial 
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relations processes (Brown, 2004). In many cases, these services are being 
transformed in response to the changing systems and processes of employment 
relations that are the result of increased forces of international competition and 
globalisation (Seeber and Lipsky, 2006). In Britain, such services are provided by the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS). As Dix and Oxenbridge 
(2004) explain, ACAS is steadily assuming a more proactive role in terms of advising 
not just on how to resolve disputes and workplace grievances but in terms of how to 
establish a more partnership driven-approach to employment-related issues based 
around consensus forms of decision-making (see also Fonstad et al, 2004).    
 
Against this backdrop, the aim of this paper is to explore the new roles being 
developed in terms of advisory and arbitration work within the context of the 
changing role of the state within a more market-driven system of industrial relations. 
The analysis is concerned with two questions. First, how does the changing role of the 
state in terms of its shift to a more advisory, indirect role impact on its mediation, 
arbitration and advisory services? That is to say – is there evidence of a new advisory 
and benchmarking driven state?  Secondly, what does this shift mean, and how does it 
relate to, the overall marketisation of the state and its move to a more neo-liberal 
approach. The paper addresses these concerns through an empirical examination of 
recent ACAS workplace projects concerned with the modernisation of the British 
National Health Service (NHS). It concludes that there is a new ‘advisory and 
benchmarking’ state evolving based on a soft-market view of industrial relations. This 
advisory capacity is concerned with mitigating the harder market imperatives of the 
state concerned with the re-organisation of the public sector, through the promotion 
and facilitation of ‘good’ employment relations. Yet this role is itself challenged by 
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the very forces it seeks to respond to, as the restructuring of the state can undermine 
the resources and activities of any new advisory and benchmarking role.   
 
2. Background: Towards the Advisory and Benchmarking State  
 
The role of the state in the economy and industrial relations 
 
The state is a significant feature of economic regulation.  It has played an important 
‘caretaker’ role and been a central focus of the post-war social democratic project 
(Hall, 1988). However, the emergence of a neo-liberal discourse from the 1970s, and 
an increased emphasis on the agendas of privatisation and market liberalisation have 
eroded the popular and political basis of state intervention. This does not mean that 
the state has disappeared, or that its changing role has gone uncontested but the 
centrality of market relations have emerged as core regulatory mechanisms, which the 
state has sought to realign itself too (Jessop, 2002a). The emergence of globalisation, 
contested as a concept though it may be (see Herod, 2002), has also eroded the state’s 
responsive capacity and has acted as an ideology that can disarm it with regards to a 
defence of its role.   
 
In historic terms, the state played a central role in assisting the development of a 
consensual and negotiated post-war social democratic settlement. Firstly, the state’s 
social and welfare-based intervention, through the indirect wage – a process Esping-
Anderson (1990) refers to as de-commodification - eased the pressure on the direct 
wage in terms of collective bargaining processes.  This was essential for national 
political bargaining at the level of the state, as well as collective bargaining at the 
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level of the sector and firm. The second dimension of the state relates to the role of 
political exchange or neo-corporatist processes. Whilst levels of neo-corporatist 
intermediation have varied, they have remained a salient feature of contemporary 
industrial relations systems (Berger and Compston, 2000). There may have been a 
move in the European context from harder forms of government regulation through 
negotiation to softer forms of governance based on the diffusion of good practice (see 
below for a discussion; Leisink and Hyman, 2005); but the role of the state remains 
important in terms of its scale, the manner of its interventions and its central 
leadership role. Thirdly, the state’s role as a legislator developed systematically 
during the 20th Century, evident in the framework of rights and obligations that exist 
within the sphere of employment relations of most economically advanced systems. 
Its role as a legislator of employment rights and obligations remains important, 
despite the current emphasis on individual employee rights. Finally, and of central 
significance for this article, the state is also an employer.   
 
The changing role of the state  
 
All these state roles have changed to some extent or another.  It is the subject of 
greater public and political scrutiny, although the extent to which it has been modified 
varies with certain states still sustaining a robust welfare commitment (Esping-
Anderson, 2000).  The role of neo-corporatist practices are less salient in terms of 
transparency but relations between organised labour and the state remain a feature of 
the European Union’s western nations (Berger and Compston, 2000; Koch, 2005),  
even if this increasingly focuses on the supply and training side of the economy.  
Thirdly, as noted above, the emphasis on collective rights has been less pronounced, 
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with the state focusing increasingly on individual rights in terms of its armoury of 
legislation (Seeber and Lipsky, 2006). This is not to deny that important forms of 
indirect regulation (Martinez Lucio and Weston, 2000) have emerged, such as 
European Works Councils and EU consultation processes, but these have not really 
altered the tapestry of collective industrial relations.  In addition, the state as an 
employer has seen a greater commitment to marketisation, restructuring and the 
adoption of ‘private’ sector organisational practices (Bach, 2002).  All these 
developments have been the subject of exhaustive debate, as to whether these are 
systematic forms of modernisation or just ‘muddling through’ a crisis of welfare 
(Bach, 2002): but these trends are apparent and they pose questions for transformation 
within the apparatus of the state. These changes in the character and function of the 
state can be seen as a direct response to the imperatives of increased competition and 
broader questions around the viability and role of the state within an increasingly 
global (and in the case of capital, mobile) economy. This has had a direct impact on 
the strategic direction of employment relations that the state has sought to purse 
through its prime role as employer. Thus, within the British context, there have been 
extensive programmes of reform in the public sector, which have sought to ‘import’ 
the logics of private sector strategies and practices. In the case of the National Health 
Service, for example, the contracting out of peripheral services such as catering and 
cleaning was an early initiative, but this has subsequently been extended to specialist 
health care services such as elderly care and large sections of IT work. There has also 
been increased interest in more decentralised systems of industrial relations 
bargaining. The emergence of new forms of grading and payment structures, as 
discussed below, are seen as forming the basis for a greater re-organisation of reward 
and promotion systems.  In addition, the emergence of private-public partnerships 
 7
 8
around infrastructure projects has started to erode the boundaries between state and 
emergent private sector interests. Finally, there is increasing use being made of 
contracts and market mechanisms in the allocation of service delivery.  
 
It is common to characterise these restructuring processes in terms of a ‘rolling back’ 
of state responsibility and regulation, yet at the same time as the state retreats from 
one sphere (for example, around public ownership or national regulation of 
employment relations), it enters or re-regulates other spheres (as in the case of public-
private partnerships or the setting of targets for performance delivery or new 
approaches to employment relations).  In this context, it is possible to talk of a new 
indirect form of state intervention (see Martínez Lucio and MacKenzie, 2004 & 
MacKenzie and Martínez Lucio, 2005).  The state provides support for actors to 
assimilate some of its roles and to work in partnership with it in a new strategic 
manner (Kooimans, 2003).  Opinions vary as to the efficacy and consistency of such 
developments, but they are nevertheless a focus of discussion within industrial 
relations, particularly, as Van der Meer et al (2005) explain, in terms of a new type of 
policy and state approach: ‘steering’.  The state does not so much lead now or direct 
but ‘steer’.  It does this not just in terms of the use of procedure; it also does this in 
terms of steering by objectives (adaptive governance) and by comparison (open 
coordination).  These developments focus on the macro aspects of the state. This has 
emerged in a context of a diminishing capacity for state intervention and macro-
corporatist co-ordination (van de Meer et al, 2005: 354-5).  There is in effect a new 
form of governance emerging that prompts, establishes criteria and compares in 
relation to what it sees as good practice in areas such as learning or co-operation 
strategies. The state therefore renews its position within a more market driven 
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economy (Visser, 1998) by adopting new roles that aim to allow its intervention to be 
shared, to allow knowledge to be imparted through references to good practice, and to 
involve stakeholders in novel ways. In the remainder of the article, we explore this 
with specific reference to the changing role of state arbitration. 
 
The changing role of state arbitration: from arbitration and dispute resolution 
towards the advisory and benchmarking state 
 
Whilst there is a limited literature on mediation and arbitration (typically in cases 
where this is highly regulated such as Australia – see, for example, Brown, 2004; and 
more broadly, Dix and Oxenbridge, 2004; Seeber and Lipsky, 2006; Towers and 
Brown, 2000; Van Gramberg, 2006), this has rarely been considered in terms of the 
changing role of the state. Yet, this is an area where widespread change is apparent. In 
the British case, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) was 
formally established (as a free service) in the mid 1970s (see Hawes, 2000, for a 
detailed history), having emerged from the social democratic policies of the 1960s 
and 1970s (Crouch, 2003; Davies and Freeland, 1993). Its remit right from the start 
included the promotion of good employment relations, and innovatory projects were 
conducted in support of this (Hawes, 2000). However, its public role was largely 
concerned with the mediation and conciliation of collective disputes and a statutory 
objective to extend and promote free collective bargaining. The neo-liberal 
Conservative governments of the 1980s-1990s were less than supportive of ACAS, 
but apart from rescinding its objective to promote free collective bargaining never 




This was to change in the early 1990s. Faced with declining numbers of collective 
disputes and a declining trade union role in workplace bargaining, the organisation of 
ACAS was restructured and it started to place more of an emphasis on individual 
conciliation and, of specific interest for this paper, advisory work (Dix and 
Oxenbridge, 2004; Purcell, 2000).  As Brown (2004) notes, this trend is observable on 
an international scale. A shift from more judicial to voluntary systems of dispute 
resolution has led to a growth in forms of ‘alternative dispute resolution’ and, for 
mediation and conciliation services in numerous countries an increased ‘advisory’ 
role in the support of ‘interest-based’ forms of workplace negotiation (Fonstad et al, 
2004). A key concern of advisory work is the pre-emption of ‘future disputes by 
encouraging good procedures and employment practices’, based on the principle that 
‘prevention is better than treatment’ (Brown, 2004: 453). In practical terms, during 
2005-06 ACAS completed 319 workplace advisory projects, addressing issues such as 
communications and consultation, the management of change and improving 
relationships and problem solving. In addition, its advisers conducted some 2002 
workplace advisory visits and delivered 2, 964 training sessions, an increasing 
proportion of which are delivered on the basis of ‘charged workplace training’ (see 
ACAS Annual Report, 2006).   
 
The propagation of good employment practice has been underpinned by the 
promotion of partnership-based working and relations between management, 
employees and their representatives (Brown, 2004; Kochan and Osterman, 1994). 
ACAS has been in the forefront of debates in partnership in Britain, having developed 
a set of practical tools around the notion of ‘working together’. This has been 
disseminated through conferences and through individual adviser’s assisting 
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organisations in the development of conciliation and consultation methods (see Stuart 
and Martinez Lucio, 2005a).  Most recently the knowledge ACAS has accumulated in 
this area has been brought together as a guide book entitled the ‘model workplace’, 
which ‘provides a benchmark for employers who want to assess their employment 
relations performance and take advantage of the benefits this offers their organisation’ 
(ACAS, 2006: 30). ACAS’s advisory activity has covered a wide variety of 
organisations and sectors, but increasingly the organisation is being invited to assist 
and facilitate with major change programmes in the public sector, most pertinently the 
National Health Service.  
 
ACAS in the context of public sector change and restructuring  
 
The role of ACAS in the public sector has been to specifically assist in the 
development of consultation processes during a period of ongoing and extensive 
restructuring and change management and an overall re-regulation of employment 
relations. Much of this has been situated within the promotion of partnership-based 
approaches to public sector reorganisation (Stuart and Martinez Lucio, 2000). Indeed, 
the Labour government has developed a raft of partnership initiatives and models 
designed to shape the conduct of public sector industrial relations. This is particularly 
pertinent in the National Health Service (NHS) (Bach, 2004), where new policies 
around human resource management, employee involvement and participation and 
working conditions have been (or are being) implemented since the late 1990s. This 
change programme has been bureaucratic and centrally driven, and has been 
accompanied by transparent sets of performance indicators and ambitious timelines 
for implementation. Against this backdrop, ACAS has played an important role in 
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facilitating a new co-operative dialogue.  As we argue throughout the paper, this 
represents a new role where the state teaches, signposts and facilitates developments 
in industrial relations through benchmarking and institutional mentoring (Martinez 
Lucio and Stuart, 2002).  
 
In the remainder of the article, we explore more systematically how this advisory and 
benchmarking role has contributed to the facilitation of change in the NHS. At the 
time of the research the NHS was one of the largest employers in Europe with over 
1.3 million employees. It had just embarked, from December 2004, on the national 
roll out of new pay equality and reform package entitled ‘Agenda for Change’. The 
programme covers all directly employed NHS staff, except senior managers and 
Doctors and Dentists. It was negotiated jointly in partnership with the NHS unions 
and enshrined in a collective agreement in November 2004. The reform package 
included the harmonisation of various terms and conditions of employment, pay 
assimilation around nine new pay bands and a new job evaluation scheme. As Bach 
(2004:3) notes, ‘[A]t the core of these (Agenda for Change) proposals is an emphasis 
on partnership working with trade unions to ensure that union representatives have 
adequate time and support to participate in the implementation of the Agenda for 
Change proposals at Trust level’. Indeed, evidence from early ‘implementer’ sites had 
shown that considerable benefits accrued from partnership working given the 
complexity of the implementation process. Yet, equally, as Bach’s (2004) research 
indicates, there were also widespread participation deficits and problems within NHS 
Trusts. The imperatives of the ‘Agenda for Change’ programme only heightened the 
need to address such challenges and establish more productive structures of 
consultation. The prospect of Agenda for Change, along with the reconfiguration of 
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many Trusts due to merger processes, had led to an unprecedented level of requests 
for ACAS assistance from NHS employers. The following analysis focuses on the 
role played by ACAS in facilitating these NHS processes of change.  We assert that 
the new softer, managerial advisory and benchmarking state comes in to assist as a 
direct response of (and is up against) the restructuring imperatives of the harder 
marketised state – an ironic twist that indicates a degree of schizophrenia within the 
new industrial relations, as the state is both an object and subject of change (Jessop, 
2002b). 
 
3. Data collection 
 
Five cases of ACAS workplace advisory projects in NHS Trusts were chosen for 
study. The cases were selected by the ACAS Research and Evaluation Section in 
consultation with ACAS advisers involved in workplace projects during the period 
2002-2004. For the purpose of our presentation the Trusts are anonymised, and 
include: Northern Trust, London Primary Care Trust, London Ambulance Service 
Trust, Eastern Trust, and Midlands Trust.  The researchers were provided with the 
contact details of the key stakeholders involved in the workplace project in each case. 
This typically involved the ACAS adviser responsible for leading the intervention and 
the lead management and trade union representatives. The researchers were also 
supplied with basic background material on each case. The empirical approach was 
qualitative, based on a research protocol for data collection that involved a 
standardised interview schedule, tailored to take account of whether the informant 
was an adviser, management representative or union representative. Management 
interviewees included Trust Human Resources managers and Chief Executive 
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Officers, while trade union interviewees included staff-side chairs (lead union 
representatives) and full-time officers (FTOs) of the Royal College of Nursing (RCN), 
Unison and Amicus. Each interview lasted between 60 and 75 minutes, and all 
interviews were tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed. In total, 16 interviews 
were conducted across the five Trusts between July and September 2004. Interviews 
were also conducted with an ACAS deputy regional director and two head office staff, 
prior to the commencement of the case research, in order to gain insights into the 
nature of ACAS workplace project interventions.  
 
4. The Advisory and Benchmarking State   
 
a) The demand for new roles and the renewing of consultation 
 
In all the Trusts, the request for assistance from ACAS was precipitated by the 
imperatives for change that had been experienced in the NHS in recent years. The 
NHS had experienced a period of substantial transformation, not only in terms of 
Human Resource (HR) strategy and its attendant emphasis on partnership working, 
but also in terms of the organisational structure of health care (see Stuart and Martinez 
Lucio, 2000).  
 
The main mechanisms for dealing with these processes of organisational change were 
Joint Negotiation Committees and/or Joint Consultation Committees. Such 
committees had been established, in one form or another, in all of the case study 
organisations, but were not considered by both management and trade union 
representatives to be operating as effectively as they should have been. Prior to the 
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ACAS intervention, many of the Trusts’ consultative structures had almost ground to 
a halt and were unable to move forward on strategic priorities. It was not uncommon 
for issues to be brought into discussion at standing consultative forums without prior 
notice, and it was rare for meetings to cover all agenda items. In a number of cases, 
senior management had stopped attending meetings in response to what they 
perceived to be an emphasis on ‘trivial’ topics, rather than ‘meaty’ issues. In some 
situations, these process problems were underpinned and compounded by a recent 
history of poor or adversarial employment relations. 
 
The ineffectiveness of the extant consultation machinery was recognised and accepted 
by both management and trade union representatives in all cases. When articulating 
how the joint consultation machinery should develop it was common for respondents 
to espouse the rhetoric of ‘partnership working’. In most cases, this was identified as 
the ultimate goal for good and effective employment relations and broader ‘cultural 
change’ within the organisations. In the case of the London Primary Care Trust, an 
ACAS-facilitated training workshop on partnership working had been held in the past, 
resulting in a series of partnership principles being added to the Trust’s union 
recognition agreement (at ACAS’s recommendation).  
 
The most advanced case with regard to working in partnership, however, was 
Midlands Trust. Following the Trust’s formation, an effective system of negotiation 
and consultation had been consolidated with the development of a partnership 
agreement. The agreement had been formulated and established with the support of 
Department for Trade and Industry Partnership Fund monies, and the advisory support 
of ACAS, and had attracted national interest as an example of good practice. When, 
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on a number of occasions, management sought to introduce change without informing 
or consulting the Trust’s unions, union representatives expressed concerns about 
management commitment to the partnership process. Accordingly, the unions decided 
to suspend their involvement in the partnership process until the broader question of 
management commitment was settled – and it was at this point that ACAS was invited 
in. As noted previously, all this activity took place against the impending 
implementation of the new NHS pay and (re)grading system, Agenda for Change.  
 
b) The Nature of ACAS Intervention 
 
In each case, the approach to ACAS was discussed and agreed jointly between 
management and trade union representatives. Respondents’ knowledge of ACAS 
varied however, as did the extent to which organisations had previous experience of 
using ACAS. Typically, either a senior trade union representative or management 
representative had been exposed to ACAS workplace project interventions in the past, 
and acted as the catalyst for the approach to ACAS. In all cases, there had been 
extensive turnover of personnel at senior level (most typically among management 
staff) and, because of this, in none of the cases did both management and union 
interviewees have previous experience of using ACAS. Nonetheless, advisers had 
developed a working relationship with key players in the organisations and an in-
depth knowledge of employment relations at each Trust. At both Midland and London 
Primary Care Trust, the lead HR representatives had a record of commissioning 




In general, trade union representatives – and particularly full-time officers - exhibited 
a high degree of knowledge and experience of ACAS, but they were more likely to 
associate ACAS with arbitration and mediation services rather than workplace 
projects – the traditional bread and butter of ACAS work. All the trade union 
respondents regarded ACAS as impartial, objective and independent. It was 
specifically these qualities, and the fact that commissioning ACAS was unlikely to be 
perceived by staff as being management-driven, that convinced many of the 
management respondents of the virtues of ACAS: it was this perceived objectivity, 
and lack of a ‘bias dilemma’ (Van Gramberg, 2006) that was seen as one of the main 
reasons for, and benefits of, commissioning ACAS as opposed to alternative third 
party organisations.  
 
c) The role of facilitation and use of knowledge assets 
 
The role played by ACAS advisers in the case study organisations provides further 
support for the findings of Dix and Oxenbridge (2004:523-524). They describe the 
advisers’ role as ‘centred on acting as a facilitator to establish facts, clarify problems, 
and help(ing) to identify solutions in order to promote joint agreements. Advisers do 
not act as an arbiter, or decide on the merit of competing positions.’ In cases, use of 
this approach was evident from the Trusts’ initial contact with ACAS through to the 
specific project intervention itself. After being approached, advisers sought to clarify 
the potential problem with management and union representatives, and once all 
parties had agreed to this, a joint working project was suggested and planned. This 
initial process often involved advisers observing Joint Staff Forums and then feeding 
their views back to participants on what they saw as problematic. The interventions 
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themselves ranged from a single workshop to a more sustained series of joint 
workshops and joint working groups. The research also confirmed the findings of Dix 
and Oxenbridge (2004) that clients valued syndicate group exercises, where 
management and union representatives work together in mixed groups to solve 
problems and agree solutions.  The role of the ACAS advisers as a link into broader 
networks of specialists dealing with organisational change, and in terms of the 
evidence base and specific case experiences they could offer, meant that the service 
was seen as contextualising the work of change within the NHS.  This benchmarking 
role was explicit and key.  
 
An important contribution of ACAS advisers in workshops was the way in which they 
instilled certain behavioural expectations and standards amongst participants and set 
clear ground rules for engagement during workshop sessions (to ensure, as one 
adviser joked, ‘no spitting, no gouging’!). Advisers also played an important role in 
drawing back from discussion of specific problems and issues.  To alleviate concerns, 
advisers’ referenced previous cases of change they had been involved, which acted as 
specific benchmarks. They also focused on underlying principles around, for example, 
the nature of consultation and negotiation, different approaches to employee 
involvement and the principles of partnership working.   The ACAS adviser managed 
to use such principles and practices – both from ACAS generated guidelines and those 
of others – to provide a set of voluntary ground rules and principles, which facilitated 
the regulation of such consultation mechanisms.   
 
The advisers’ knowledge assets were based not only on awareness of external 
developments but also of internal, organisation specific ones. In many of the Trusts, 
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respondents had little knowledge of key employment relations events in the 
organisation’s past. This was due to a lack of record keeping by past managers, and 
high turnover among key managers, particularly HR managers. Management turnover 
created ‘memory gaps’ in many organisations, and this created opportunities and 
challenges for ACAS advisers. Where advisers had worked with Trusts over time, 
they played a prominent role in recording events and organisational developments. 
This allowed advisers to counsel participants – including ‘new’ managers and 
employee representatives - not just about sectoral developments and good practice, 
but also about the history, challenges and successes of their own employing 
organisation. Advisers were therefore able to place emerging issues or problems 
within an historical organisational context. This provided an important explanatory 
tool for all participants.  However, turnover among HR staff also meant that advisers 
were often not able to deal with consistent points of reference within organisations, a 
point we return to below.  
 
d) The context and limits of the benchmarking state  
 
In this section, we consider some of the challenges identified during the research with 
regard to ACAS workplace advisory projects. We then locate these challenges to the 
new state role in the light of the changing strategies of the state as a public sector 
employer, noting that there are fundamental contradictions within the state project of 
marketisation and modernisation.  
 
The implementation of action plans agreed at ACAS facilitated workshops required 
the ongoing support of middle and line management. Yet, getting middle and line 
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managers to attend some of the workshops was identified as an issue. This was more 
of a problem where the ACAS intervention involved ongoing workshops and project 
work. It was reported that the key issues were achieved during the first workshop, and 
there was less certainty over the value of subsequent sessions. This was identified as 
an issue, to some extent, in the Northern and Eastern cases. The role of the Chief 
Executive in such workshops also seems to be an issue. Where there is positive 
support and attendance by the Chief Executive at such events this seems to resonate 
and demonstrates commitment to the wider management constituency of the 
perceived importance of the work. However, the pressures on management resources, 
the problems of management and trade union capacities (Bach, 2004), and increasing 
decentralisation of decision-making impacted on the long-term development of 
partnership and on the effectiveness of ACAS facilitation of new participation 
structures. Underpinning this challenge was the ongoing restructuring of the public 
sector.  
 
Whilst it was clear that in some of the cases joint problem solving projects were 
disseminated to the wider body of staff (for example, the Eastern case), this did not 
always take place. Indeed, it was common for both management and trade union 
representatives to report that this is something that could have been done more 
systematically. In this context, ACAS needed to provide advice on the roll out of 
action plans.  However, the evolution of more direct forms of communication and 
new managerial forms of involvement did not always sit well with these ACAS based 
interventions, as management lower down the line of command looked to alternative 




Furthermore, for many of our respondents recalling key developments and 
improvements in employment relations that emerged from ACAS intervention was 
not straightforward.  Two obvious problems were apparent.  First, few of the 
management and/or union representatives interviewed had kept a systematic set of 
records of the nature of the ACAS intervention or the outcomes of this work. It was 
common for respondents to be prompted about what the advisory work focused on 
during the interviews. In some cases, this was simply because ACAS had worked with 
the organisation closely over a number of years on a number of different projects. 
However, the development of good practice necessitated a more resourced industrial 
relations system and reflective actors – the stress of organisational developments did 
not allow for this and much rested increasingly on key individuals. Secondly, and 
more common, was the tendency for key actors in management (and the human 
resources department particularly) to have left the organisation or moved to 
alternative position. The departure of such individuals created ‘memory gaps’ in the 
organisation (Martínez Lucio and Stuart, 2007), and it was not surprising that their 
replacements often had difficulty recalling developments around ACAS work or the 
precise features of joint working activities and outcomes.  
 
The issue of staff turnover raises a number of opportunities and challenges for ACAS. 
The high turnover of persona and, a shift in the culture of stable public sector 
employment meant that, ironically, ACAS advisers could play a prominent role in 
recording events and organisational developments, allowing them to advise 
organisations not just about sectoral developments and good practice but also specific 
organisational histories, challenges and successes. However, as we noted above, staff 
turnover within personnel departments meant that ACAS advisers were not able to 
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find and deal with consistent points of reference within organisations, and had to 
(re)legitimate their role in some cases. This brought to the fore the importance of 
ACAS advisory roles within broader practitioner communities, networks and forums. 
This external factor was very important for maintaining contact within regional 
personnel management and trade union networks. Personnel managers often 
developed relationships with ACAS advisers as they moved between posts 
(exemplified by the London Primary Care Trust case) but this could only continue if 
the mobility was within the local region.   Hence, ACAS had to act as the co-ordinator 
of public sector HRM networks in the face of increasing disruption and change.  It 
was as if one part of the state had to try to help public bodies overcome disruption 
brought by harder features of state policy on restructuring and reorganisation through 
its broader links.  
 
Finally, there was the challenge of evaluation. Whilst most management and union 
respondents were sanguine that the facilitated workshops had impacted beyond the 
immediate improvements in how the consultative machinery functioned, they were 
unable to marshal specific examples or data to illustrate this. In some cases, it was 
recognised that trying to link, causally, the impact of the ACAS work on broader 
organisational outcomes, for employee satisfaction, was complex and problematic. 
For example, the HR director at Eastern explained that whilst staff satisfaction 
surveys were conducted on an annual basis at the Trust they were not directly 
comparable. More generally, the limited reporting within organisations of the 
advisory work and the high turnover of personnel staff hampered any systematic 
evaluation. The only evaluations conducted were those of the ACAS adviser. Whilst 
this is an expectation of such interventions, this tends to be relatively informal 
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(although all have to write a formal report on the project for ACAS records). 
Evaluation with the organisation typically took the form of a phone call a month or so 
after the facilitated workshops and again six months later. In a couple of cases, the 
projects had ‘written in’ an ACAS review of the Joint Consultative Committee six 
months after the work (for example, at Northern and Midlands Trusts) and the 
organisations appeared to be very keen on this. Again, this observation was to be 
relatively informal and not based on an evaluation around specific criteria. To some 
extent, this degree of informality seemed to be celebrated as a sign of good relations 
between ACAS and the organisations and in a number of cases ongoing work with the 
organisations meant that the advisers could monitor progress on an ongoing process. 
However, any on going monitoring is focused on the nature of staff-management 
relations than more quantitative employment relations outcomes. Therefore, this 
approach to evaluating impact was caught between the tensions emerging from a soft 
people centred-approach and a harder outcomes and efficiency centred approach.  





In empirical terms, our study reveals the contribution of ACAS intervention to 
evolving programmes of organisational change in the British NHS, through a process 
of facilitating engagement and co-operation (i.e. partnership) between management 
and trade union representatives. This facilitative process was found to play an 
important role in ‘legitimating’ attempts by management and unions to work together 
in partnership. In historical terms, each organisation had experienced a period of poor 
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and/or adversarial employment relations and was looking to establish a new climate of 
co-operation to foster cultural and organisational change. This was particularly 
pressing within the NHS given the imperatives of the Agenda for Change reforms that 
were being rolled out. The establishment of consultative structures to oversee the 
smooth implementation of this change programme was a necessity. ACAS 
interventions were found to be successful in establishing (or reviving) effective 
forums for management-union consultation. However, the broader impact of ACAS 
was not limited to the facilitation of structures to assist corporate change and 
performance. Such interventions were also found to promote, for example, a wider 
recognition of the legitimate different interests and role of unions and management 
(Stuart and Martinez Lucio, 2005b).  
 
How do we situate our analysis in terms of the broader impact of globalisation on 
employment relations? Our central contention, unlike those who see an increasingly 
limited role for the nation state, is that the role of the state in industrial relations 
remains important. Yet that role is, by definition, subject to change, as the ability of 
the state to pursue, and more significantly police, hard regulation in the area of 
industrial relations is challenged, and as public sector employment relations are 
opened up and restructured in the face of privatisation and marketisation tendencies. 
One consequences of this is a new role for third party intervention that is focused less 
on traditional dispute resolution and legality, but more on advisory interventions as 
organisational actors look to purse more voluntary and preventative forms of 
settlement. As Brown (2004: 454) eloquently explains: 
 
The opening up of the world economy and of public services to wider 
competition is changing the nature of third party intervention.  There is 
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diminishing scope for employers and trade unions to battle out their 
differences in the sheltered arena of a national market or monopoly 
service…unions are being forced to shift their manner of operation away from 
confrontation, towards a greater reliance on cooperation with employers…The 
implications for third party intervention agencies…is less call for them to 
resolve collective disputes…to some legal code…contesting parties 
increasingly need to be guided to a settlement that reflects the very practical 
and evident demands of [the] market pressures… 
 
In the British context, then, we see a dual dynamic. At one level, the state is subject to 
change that necessitates new forms of preventative dispute resolution and advisory 
capacities. At another level, it actually facilitates, through the state agency of ACAS, 
steers and benchmarks change through a new proactive role. This role consists of 
facilitating change through direct advice, the mobilisation of knowledge assets, and 
the propagation of new co-operative views of industrial relations.  Whether such a 
role should be performed by a state agency, or a privatised body, is a matter of debate. 
But we would share Brown’s (2004) assertion that more privatised bodies are less 
likely to be perceived as independent and unbiased – a point supported by empirical 
research in the US (Seeber and Lipsky, 2006).  
 
The roles of learning, advice, and benchmarking are fad terms in management 
sciences but they are also new roles within organisations.  Whether effective or purely 
rhetorical is not a subject for this paper although the authors would err towards the 
latter interpretation.  What is of relevance is that such developments are actually 
visible in terms of the way state operates. The way the state operates is evolving 
towards a ‘consultative’ orientation in Britain.  A cynical position would state that this 
is a less resource intensive way of regulating industrial relations.  Whatever the logic 
behind it, it is apparent in terms of the delivery of models and practices.  At the heart 
of much of this is ACAS. It is, therefore, attractive to think in terms of an emerging 
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advisory and benchmarking state.  The emergence of toolkits, management and union 
seminars and focused advice is now a new role – a new bridge over not solely the 
troubled waters of industrial relations but the marshy waters of de-regulation and 
decentralisation. Key questions for future research remain over the extent to which 
this is a new form of fire fighting and desire to avoid evolving forms of conflict at the 
heart of the new welfare state.  The decision by the British government to reduce the 
resources of ACAS during 2005 indicated that the drive to efficiency is a feature, and 
irony, of all public sector organisations even those trying to construct cultures and 
processes aimed at creating partnerships for improving efficiency.  Underpinning the 
new models of the state intervention are tensions between the informational and 
knowledge based approaches on the one hand and the market and restructuring logics 
of change on the other.  The former are about responding to the latter: but they also 




ACAS (2006) ACAS Annual Report and Accounts 2005/6. London: The Stationary 
Office. HC 1239 
 
Bach, S. (2002) 'Public sector employment relations under Labour: Muddling through 
on modernisation?' British Journal of Industrial Relations, 40(2) 319-339. 
 
Bach, S. (2004) ‘Employee participation and union voice in the National Health 




Berger, S. and Compston, H. (eds) (2002) Policy Concertation and Social Partnership 
in Western Europe. New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books: 
 
Brown, W. (2004) ‘Third party intervention reconsidered: An international 
perspective’, Journal of Industrial Relations, 46(4): 448-458 
 
Crouch, C. (2003) ‘The state: economic management and incomes policy’, in 
Edwards, P. (ed) Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Second edition. 
 
Davies, P. and Freedland, M. (1993) Labour Legislation and Public Policy. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Dix, G. and Oxenbridge, S. (2004) ‘Coming to the table with Acas: from conflict to 
cooperation’, Employee Relations, 26(5): 510-530. 
 
Esping-Andersen , G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: 
Polity Press 
 
Esping-Andersen , G. (2000) ‘Who is harmed by labour market regulations? 
quantitative evidence’ in Esping-Anderson, G. and M. Regini (eds.) 2000. Why 
Deregulate Labour Markets? Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Fonstad, N.O., McKersie, R.B. and Eaton, S.C. (2004) ‘Interest-based negotiations in 




Hall, S. (1988) The Hard Road to Renewal. London: Verso 
 
Herod, A. (2001) ‘Labour Internationalism and the contradictions of globalisation: Or, 
why the local is sometimes still important in a global economy’ in P. Waterman and J. 
Wills (eds.), 101-122, Place, Space and the New Labour Internationalisms Oxford: 
Blackwell  
 
Jessop, B. (2002a) ‘Liberalism, neo-liberalism, and urban governance: A state-
theoretical perspective’, Antipode, 34(3): 425-472 
 
Jessop, B (2002b) The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity  
 
Hawes, W. (2000) ‘Setting the pace or running alongside? ACAS and the changing 
employment relationship’, in Towers, B. and Brown, W. (eds), Employment Relations 
in Britain: 25 years of the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service. London: 
Blackwell 
 
Koch, M. (2005) ‘Wage determination, socio-economic regulation and the state’ 
European Journal of Industrial Relations, 11(3): 327-346 
 
Kochan, T.A. (2006) ‘Adapting industrial relations to serve knowledge-based 




Kochan, T. A. and Osterman (1994) The Mutual Gains Enterprise: Forging a 
Winning Partnership among Labour, Management and Government, Boston: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Kooiman, J. (2003) Governing as Governance London: Sage  
 
Leisink, P. and Hyman, R. (2005) ‘Introduction: The dual evolution of 
Europeanization and varieties of governance’ European Journal of Industrial 
Relations 11(3): 277-286.  
 
MacKenzie, R and Martínez Lucio, M. (2005) ‘The realities of regulatory change: 
Beyond the fetish of deregulation’ Sociology 39(3): 499-517 
 
Martínez Lucio, M. and MacKenzie, R. (2004) ‘Unstable boundaries? Evaluating the 
‘new regulation’ within employment relations’ Economy and Society Vol. 33(1): 77-
97 
 
Martínez Lucio, M. and Stuart, M. (2000) ‘Assessing partnership: the prospects for 
and challenges of modernisation’, Employee Relations, 24(3): 252-261 
 
Martínez Lucio, M, and Stuart, M. (2007 forthcoming) ‘Sustaining New Industrial 
Relations in the Public Sector: The politics of trust and co-operation in the context of 
organisational dementia and disarticulation’ P. Dibben, P. James, I. Roper, and G. 
Wood (eds.) Modernising Work in Public Services London: Macmillan  
 29
 30
Martinez Lucio, M. and Weston, S. (2000) ‘European Works Councils and ‘Flexible 
Regulation’: The Politics of Intervention’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, 6 
203-216 
 
Oxenbridge, S. and Brown, W. (2002) ‘The two faces of partnership? An assessment 
of partnership and cooperative employer/trade union relationships’, Employee 
Relations, 24(3): 262-276. 
 
Purcell, J. (2000) ‘After collective bargaining: Acas in the age of human resource 
management’, in Towers, B. and Brown, W. (eds), Employment Relations in Britain: 
25 years of the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service. London: Blackwell 
 
Regini, M. (2000) ´´The dilemmas of labour market regulation’ in Esping-Anderson, 
G. and M. Regini (eds.) 2000. Why Deregulate Labour Markets? Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
Seeber, R.L. and Lipsky, D.B. (2006) ‘The ascendancy of employment arbitrators in 
US employment relations: a new actor in the American system?’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations. 44(4): 719-756 
 
Stuart, M. and Martinez Lucio, M. (2000) ‘Renewing the model employer: Changing 
employment relations and partnership in the health and private sectors’, Journal of 




Stuart, M. and Martinez Lucio, M. (2005a) Partnership and Modernisation in 
Employment Relations. Abingdon. Routledge. 
 
Stuart, M. and Martinez Lucio, M. (2005b) Acas in the NHS: Helping improve 
employment relations in response to Agenda for Change. Research Paper 06/05. 
London: ACAS 
 
Towers, B. and Brown, W. (eds) (2000) Employment Relations in Britain: 25 Years of 
the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service. London: Blackwell.  
 
van der Meer, M., Visser, J. and Wilthagen, T. (2005) ‘Adaptive and reflexive 
governance: The limits of organized decentralization’ European Journal of Industrial 
Relations,  11(3): 347-365.  
 
Van Gramberg, B. (2006) ‘The rhetoric and reality of workplace alternative dispute 
resolution’, Journal of Industrial Relations, 48(2): 175-191 
 
Visser, J. (1998) ‘Two cheers for corporatism: One for the market’ British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 36(2): 269-92 
 
 31
